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ABSTRACT
We study illiquidity in the ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets from 2008 to 2019 by
using an illiquidity measure, which is based on a proxy of the amount of arbitrage
capital available in sovereign bond markets. Our analysis identifies three drivers of
illiquidity in Singapore, namely economic policy uncertainty, the default spread and the
gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate. In contrast, illiquidity of all other markets
is mostly not characterized by economic drivers. It appears that overall liquidity is
lower in the markets outside Singapore and therefore deviations in the yield curves
are higher on average and arbitrage eliminates larger deviations not immediately but
in a delayed manner.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Price deviations in the yield curve of the U.S. Treasury market are able to reflect
liquidity of varying origins and magnitudes (Hu et al., 2013). However, the U.S.
Treasury market is very unique in several dimensions, which distinguishes this
bond market from others, like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
sovereign bond markets.1 Therefore, additional research in other sovereign bond
markets can provide new insights into liquidity and fixed-income arbitrage. In
addition, it is important to understand the characteristics of bond liquidity as
it is one of the major drivers of sovereign bond yields (Kinateder and Wagner,
2017). The ASEAN sovereign bond markets are geographically and economically
different from the U.S., and there is a lack of research in the area of ASEAN bond
liquidity (Tripathi et al., 2020), which motivates us to analyze how liquidity events
transmit through price deviation in the yield curve outside the U.S.
In this paper, we use a bond market-specific illiquidity measure proposed
by Hu et al. (2013) to study illiquidity in the ASEAN-5 sovereign fixed income
markets. This illiquidity (noise) measure is based on the intuition that the level
of illiquidity in fixed income markets and the arbitrage capital available in these
markets are closely related. During tranquil periods, arbitrageurs usually have no
shortage of capital, therefore, market prices are closer to their fundamental value
as above average-price deviations are immediately corrected by arbitrageurs.
In times of market stress, there is usually a lack of arbitrage capital as falling
prices force arbitrageurs to provide additional funds or securities (e.g. due to
a margin call), which can lead to significant differences between market prices
and their fundamental values. Therefore, Hu et al. (2013) argue that transitory
price deviations (the so-called “noise”) in the bond market contain important
information about how liquidity evolves over time in fixed income markets.
Our focus lies on the five founding countries of the ASEAN, namely Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. We first estimate monthly
yield curves for each of the five ASEAN sovereign bond markets. Then, based on
these results, we calculate the noise measure for each country’s sovereign bond
market. Finally, we apply a multiple time series regression using a comprehensive
set of explanatory variables to identify the drivers of illiquidity in the ASEAN-5
sovereign bond markets. The country-specific explanatory variables include
the country’s local equity market return, the gold return in local currency, the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate and the inflation rate. In addition, we
account for common explanatory variables, namely the corporate bond spread (as
a proxy for the aggregate credit cycle), economic policy uncertainty, implied bond
volatility, the steepness of the riskless Singapore term structure, and the Chicago
Board Option Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX).
Our results show that illiquidity conditions in Singapore’s sovereign bond
market follow our expectations, where noise (illiquidity) jumps during the global
financial crisis and fluctuates on a very low level afterwards. In contrast, the
1

The U.S. market is one of the most liquid and the largest sovereign bond market in the world. In Q4
2019, the market size of the U.S. sovereign bond market was 19,710 billion USD compared to 816
billion USD in ASEAN-5 countries (Sources: Bank of International Settlement; Asian Development
Bank).
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noise results of the other ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets are characterized
by a significant negative autocorrelation and mostly not by economic drivers.
Moreover, noise in these bond markets is significantly higher during tranquil
periods as compared to Singapore. The difference between Singapore and the
remaining ASEAN-5 markets could be due to several reasons.
Firstly, Singapore has the strongest credit rating on sovereign bonds
throughout the entire sample period and can, therefore, be treated as a safe haven.
All other ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets are rated weaker. As a result, there
could be a flight-to-quality effect within the ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets.
Secondly, Singapore is a global financial centre and, thus, spill-overs from other
financial centres, such as the U.S., affect this country more than other countries,
which have a different economic focus. Thirdly, arbitrageurs also account for other
factors than noise such as the basic level of liquidity. Lower basic liquidity in the
ASEAN-5 markets outside Singapore as well as the lower credit rating of these
markets might reduce the number of international arbitrageurs. Thus, a higher
level of basic liquidity in Singapore’s sovereign market could also explain why in
tranquil periods small deviations in this yield curve are eliminated by arbitrage
immediately, while there are a delayed reaction and higher yield curve deviations
in the other markets.
Moreover, we identify three drivers of illiquidity for Singapore’s sovereign
bond market. The main driver is the corporate bond spread (as a proxy for the
aggregate credit cycle), while at the same time an increase in economic policy
uncertainty and declines in the aggregate business cycle (proxied by GDP growth
rate), significantly drive sovereign bond illiquidity in Singapore. Our results also
indicate that price deviations in Singapore’s yield curve contain unique countryspecific information. Lastly, we find that our explanatory variables can explain
illiquidity jumps during a market-wide illiquidity event but not the fluctuation of
noise on a low level in tranquil periods.
This paper is related to the existing literature in several dimensions. First, it
relates to the literature on how the amount of arbitrage capital in a specific market
affects the effectiveness of arbitrage forces, or “limits of arbitrage”, and possible
price deviations (see e.g., Leland and Rubinstein 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997;
Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Duffie, 2010). Musto
et al. (2015) find a large and systematic mispricing during the global financial
crisis between notes and bonds with identical cash flows. Mitchell and Pulvino
(2012) provide a detailed and informative account of the financing of hedge funds
during the global financial crisis and its potential implications for asset prices.
More recently, Fleckenstein et al. (2014) document a large increase of mispricing
between Treasury bonds and inflation-swapped Treasury inflation-protected
securities during the 2008 global financial crisis. Second, the paper is related to the
literature applying the noise measure of Hu et al. (2013) to sovereign bond markets
as recommended by Durham (2015). Moinas et al. (2018) apply several illiquidity
measures in a joint setting to the European sovereign bond market. Their empirical
results show that market illiquidity shocks tighten funding constraints. For the
Japanese sovereign bond market, Hattori (2019) documents a significant jump of
noise during the global financial crisis, which provides some evidence that the
illiquidity measure captures market-wide illiquidity shocks. Third, this paper is
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2021
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related to the literature identifying potential drivers of illiquidity (see e.g. Goyenko
et al., 2011; Helwege et al., 2014; Adrian et al., 2017; Chung and Chuwonganant,
2018). Lastly, it is also related to the literature dealing with the relationship
between sovereign bond yields and illiquidity (see e.g. Kinateder and Wagner,
2017; Kinateder et al., 2017). Our study contributes to this literature by thoroughly
analysing illiquidity in the ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets using a recently
published liquidity proxy, which is explicitly designed for fixed-income markets.
In addition, we not only focus on country-specific differences in illiquidity, but
also study to which extent the respective bond market’s illiquidity is related to
various economic variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
methodology for curve fitting, estimating illiquidity (noise) and identifying drivers
of illiquidity. Section III describes the sample data and contains the explanatory
variables as well as a description of their theoretical relation to the illiquidity
measure. Section IV conducts an analysis of the empirical results for curve fitting,
noise and illiquidity drivers. Section V provides implications of our findings for
investors. Finally, Section VI concludes.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Construction of the Illiquidity Measure
The construction of the illiquidity measure is based on the approach of Hu et al.
(2013). We calculate the illiquidity measure, Noisejm, in country j at month m using
the root mean square error:
(1)
where Njm is the number of government bonds available in country j in month
m, yijm is the market yield of bond i, and ŷij(bjm) is the respective model-implied
yield of bond i in country j in month m.2 We use the well-known Svensson
(1994) approach to estimate the model-implied yield curve.3 Therefore, we have
bjm=(βjm,0,βjm,1,βjm,2,βjm,3,τjm,1,τjm,2), where βjm,0,βjm,0+βjm,1,τjm,1, and τjm,2 must be positive.
The parameter vector bjm of the Svensson (1994) approach is obtained by minimizing
the weighted sum of squared deviations ξjm between the model-implied and the
empirically observable prices:
(2)

2

3

The market yield is calculated numerically based on the observed market prices and the future cash
flows of the corresponding bond i in country j in month m.
Alternative methods may be applied. Lapshin (2019), for example, proposes a Bayesian nonparametric framework that addresses aspects of the shapes of yield curves including those of
emerging markets.
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where
denotes the model-implied price for bond i in country j in month
m,Pijm is the observable market price of bond i in country j in month m, and Dijm is
the Macaulay duration for bond i in country j in month m. The price deviations
are weighted by the inverse of Macaulay’s bond duration to guarantee that they
are efficiently minimized in the yield space. In contrast to the direct minimization
of the yield space, this method has the benefit that it avoids large computing costs
that are necessary for the numerical conversion of prices into yields (Hu et al.,
2013). We use the method of generalized reduced gradients to minimize Eq. (2).
B. Drivers of Illiquidity
To study the drivers of illiquidity in the ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets, we run
a multiple time series regression for each country. We regress the first differences
of the estimated noise on a comprehensive set of explanatory variables to identify
the impact of potential drivers on monthly changes in noise:
(3)
where ∆ denotes the first difference operator, Noisejm is the noise measure
given in Eq. (1) for country j in month m. The vectors
and
contain a set of k+1 explanatory variables and regression
coefficients for each country j, respectively. The unexplained variation in the noise
measure is denoted by εjm, where
.
III. DATA
In this section, we introduce the data used for curve fitting and estimating the noise
measure. Moreover, we describe our explanatory variables used in the multiple
regression and their theoretical relation to the noise measure.
A. Sovereign Bonds
We use monthly sovereign bond data for five ASEAN market countries, namely
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand from Thomson
Reuters Datastream. We set the time frame for our sample from January 2008
to January 2019 because, for most of the analyzed bond markets, there is not
enough data available before 2008. For Malaysia, there is no bond-specific data
available before August 2009, thus the Malaysian sample starts on this time point.
In order to ensure a comparable sample, we use bonds which are non-callable,
non-flower, and with no special tax treatment. We assume observations with
negative prices or yields as well as yields larger than 30% as measurement errors
and therefore exclude them from the sample. Since the number of bonds declared
as measurement errors are negligible compared to the total number of bonds this
should not affect our estimation. Bonds with remaining maturities less than one
month are dropped from the sample, due to potential liquidity problems. We also
remove bonds with maturity larger than 30 years as our sample only consists of
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2021
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a few such observations. Furthermore, we only consider bonds that are issued in
the local currency.
On average, we have 35 bonds for Indonesia, 30 for Malaysia, 69 for the
Philippines, 15 for Singapore, and 39 for Thailand with maturity between one
month and 30 years. Contrary, Hu et al. (2013) use bonds and bills from one
month to ten years for yield curve fitting and bonds from one year to ten years for
estimating the noise measure.4 They argue that the short end of the yield curve is
known to be noisier than other parts of the yield curve. Moreover, the short end is
unlikely to be the object of arbitrage capital, which is the main motivation of the
noise measure. Bonds with long maturity might suffer from instable supply, and
thus could introduce unnecessary time-series noise to the measure.
B. Explanatory Variables of Sovereign Bond Illiquidity
This section contains a description of our explanatory variables and their theoretical
relation to our estimated noise measure. The explanatory variables are grouped in
common and country-specific variables.
B1. Common Variables
Corporate Bond Spread: The difference between the Moody’s Aaa and Baa-rated
corporate bond yields is commonly regarded as default spread. A decline in the
credit supply leads to a decline in asset values, an increase in incentives to default,
and a widening of yield spreads on private debt instruments of the economic
downturn as lenders demand compensation for the expected increase in defaults
(Gilchrist et al., 2009). Given this logic, the corporate bond spread can also be
interpreted as a proxy for the aggregate credit cycle (Adrian et al., 2017). Although
the empirical results are all related to the U.S. market, we assume the corporate
bond spread as an indicator for global systemic risk, involving the ASEAN-5
market. Given the above results, we expect a positive relation between changes in
the corporate bond spread, ∆CBSm, and noise changes.
Economic Policy Uncertainty: Several studies show that uncertainty reduces
liquidity provision in financial markets (see e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen,
2009; Nagel, 2012). For example, increased uncertainty may induce additional
risk premium requirements, which could force market makers to withdraw
liquidity provision from the market. Baker et al. (2016) propose a monthly index of
economic policy uncertainty (EPU) that reflects the frequency of articles in leading
newspapers containing a trio of terms pertaining to the economy, uncertainty, and
policy-related matters. Davis (2016) constructs a monthly index of global economic
policy uncertainty (GEPU), which is a GDP-weighted average of national EPU
indices for 21 countries that account for roughly 80% of global output at market
4

If we used the same data criteria as Hu et al. (2013), we would need to shrink the estimation period
for most of the countries even further. As a result, we could not construct the noise measure during
the global financial crisis, which would make our results less interpretable. Lastly, due to the low
number of bond observations, observed maturities do not fully cover the estimation period of the
estimated yield curves from one month to 30 years. The “gaps” within the estimation period might
affect the reliability of curve fitting.
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exchange rates. We use the GEPU index to model economic policy uncertainty for
the countries Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Given the above
empirical and theoretical results, we expect a positive relation between changes
in global economic policy uncertainty, ∆EPUm, and noise changes. For Singapore,
we use changes in its economic policy uncertainty index,
, as Singapore
is an international financial center and the most developed country within the
ASEAN-5 group.
Implied Bond Volatility: To measure implied bond volatility, we use the CBOE
10-year U.S. Treasury Note Volatility Index (TYVIX), calculated and published by
the Chicago Board Option Exchange (CBOE).5 The TYVIX measures a constant 30day expected volatility of 10-year Treasury Note futures prices and is calculated
based on transparent pricing from Chicago Board of Trade’s (CBOT) actively traded
options on the Treasury Note futures. As there are no publicly available sovereign
bond volatility indexes of the ASEAN-5 market, we use implied volatility in the
U.S. Treasury market to proxy this indicator. Since existing literature provides
empirical evidence of a negative relation between volatility and liquidity (see e.g.,
Engle et al., 2012; Adrian et al., 2017), we expect increases (decreases) in implied
bond volatility, ∆BondVm, to be associated with an increase (decrease) in noise.
Term Structure Slope: We use differences between the 10-year and 2-year
Singapore sovereign bond yield to calculate the riskless term structure slope.
Since Singapore is the only country in the ASEAN-5 market, which has the
highest possible rating on sovereign bonds (Aaa), we use its term structure slope
for all countries. The existing literature finds that the slope of the yield curve has
significant predictive power in explaining business cycle fluctuations (see e.g.,
Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Rudebusch and Williams, 2009). An increase in the
slope of the term structure is a common indicator of prospective economic growth
(see e.g., Fama and French, 1989; Martell, 2008; Iyke, 2017). Following this logic, a
steeper slope may indicate a growing economy leading to higher liquidity in the
market. Consequently, we would expect a positive relation between ∆Slopem and
noise changes.
VIX: The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) is a popular measure of the stock
market’s expectation of volatility, which is also known as “fear index” or “fear
gauge” (see e.g., Whaley, 2000; Simon and Wiggins, 2001; Whaley, 2009). Moreover,
there is some evidence that VIX is a cross-market fear gauge. An increase in VIX
suppresses returns of the sock markets in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand during the U.S. subprime crisis (Abduhl-Rahman and
Sidek, 2011; Lim, 2009). In addition, Bao et al. (2011) show that monthly changes
in aggregate bond market liquidity are strongly related to changes in VIX. Since
market illiquidity increases when VIX increases, a positive (negative) change in
VIX, i.e. ∆VIXm, should be associated with increasing (decreasing) noise.

5

Adrian et al. (2017) use the Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate index (MOVE) to calculate
implied Treasury volatility. MOVE data is not are not available publicly, therefore we use the TYVIX.
As both indexes measure implied volatility in the Treasury market and the CBOE is a well-known
provider of volatility indexes (e.g. VIX), we also assume the TYVIX as a reliable measure.
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B2. Country-specific Variables
Local Equity Market Return: The return of the local equity index is an indicator
of the country-specific business climate. During times of market turmoil, stock
prices are informative linkages between the real and financial sides of economy,
due to their forward-looking nature. Chung and Chuwonganant (2018) show that
during crisis periods lower stock returns do not just arise from greater expected
risk premiums but also from greater expected illiquidity premiums. Moreover,
the authors provide evidence that stock’s return is more sensitive to unexpected
changes in volatility when liquidity disappears. Following this logic, we expect
a negative relationship between changes in local equity market returns, REjm,
and changes in noise. The local monthly compounding equity market returns
are calculated by using monthly closing prices from the following equity market
indexes: IDX Composite (Indonesia), KLCI 30 (Malaysia), PSE 30 (the Philippines),
STI 30 (Singapore), and SET 100 (Thailand).6
Local Gold Return: Gold is a prominent safe haven, while also being a risky
asset. However, the function of gold as safe haven in the ASEAN market literature
is scarce. According to Ziaei (2012), gold can act as a hedge against equity, but
their results show that the gold price cannot be considered as a safe haven in the
ASEAN +3 market.7 Contrary, the results of a more recent study from Nguyen et
al. (2016), using a mixed-copula approach, show that gold may be a safe haven
asset during a market crash for Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, but not for
Indonesia and the Philippines. Despite opposing results from existing literature,
we use the local gold return, RGjm, as an explanatory variable and expect a positive
relationship between the local gold return and changes in noise, as an increase
in noise indicates the need for a safe haven. The gold returns are calculated for
each country using the London gold bullion market’s monthly gold fixing prices
previously converted into local currency.
GDP Growth Rate: Following the intuition of Hu et al. (2013), which we use to
calculate our liquidity measure, a downturn in the overall economy could lead to a
deterioration in arbitrage capital, and, thus, increase illiquidity. Contrary, during
a normal business cycle there should be plenty of arbitrage available leading to
a low level of illiquidity. As a result, we control for GDP growth as growth in
the aggregate output of an economy. Since GDP statistics are available only at
a quarterly frequency, we use linear interpolation (see e.g., Adrian et al., 2017)
to obtain the monthly GDP level for each country. Based on the GDP level, we
calculate the monthly GDP growth rate. We expect a negative relation between
relative change in the GDP growth rate, ΔGDPjm, and the noise measure.
Inflation Rate: We also consider the inflation rate, measured by the monthly
relative changes in the local consumer price index (CPI). Referring to the logic
of the Phillips curve, inflation controls for the output gap and future price level
expectations of an economy. We expect that the relative change in the inflation
rate, ΔInflationjm, is negatively related to changes in the noise measure.
6

7

The abbreviations have the following meaning: Indonesia Stock Exchange Composite (IDX
Composite), Kuala Lumpur Composite Index 30 (KLCI 30), Philippine Stock Exchange Composite
Index 30 (PSE 30), FTSE Straits Times Index 30 (STI 30) and Stock Exchange of Thailand Index (SET
100).
In Ziaei’s (2012) study, the ASEAN +3 market includes five ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) as well as China, Japan and South Korea.
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Table 1 summarizes the explanatory variables and provides the data sources as
well as expected effect on changes in the noise measure.
Table 1.
Definition of Explanatory Variables
This table contains a summary of the explanatory variables including their expected sign and the data source.

Variable
∆CBSm
∆EPUm
∆BondVm
∆Slopem
∆VIXm

Description

Source

Expected
Sign

Panel A: Common variables
Changes in the corporate bond spread
FRED
(Moody’s Baa-Aaa corporate bond yields)
Changes in the Global Economic Policy
http://www.policyuncertainty.
Uncertainty Index (GEPU)
com
Changes in the CBOE 10-year U.S.
CBOE
Treasury Note Volatility Index (TYVIX)
Slope of the Singapore sovereign bond Monetary Authority of Singapore
yield curve
(MAS)
Changes in the CBOE Volatility Index
CBOE
(VIX)

+
+
+
+
+

Panel B: Country-specific variables
∆EPUmSing
REjm
RGjm
∆GDPjm
∆Inflationjm

Changes in Singapore’s Economic Policy
Uncertainty Index
Local equity market Return:
IDX Composite (Indonesia), KLCI 30
(Malaysia), PSE 30 (Philippines), STI 30
(Singapore) and SET 100 (Thailand)
Gold return in local currency
Relative changes in GDP levels
Relative changes in the consumer price
index (CPI)

http://www.policyuncertainty.
com

+

Thomson Reuters Eikon

-

FRED, Yahoo Finance
Thomson Reuters Eikon
Bank of International Settlement
(BIS)

+
-

IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we first present and discuss the results of the sovereign bond
illiquidity measure Noisejm for each ASEAN country, including the yield curve
fitting process as a main part of illiquidity estimation. Then, we examine the ability
of several common variables (∆CBSm, ∆EPUm, ∆BondVm, ∆Slopem, and ∆VIXm) as
well as country-specific variables (∆EPUmSing, REjm, RGjm, ΔGDPjm, and ΔInflationjm)
to explain changes in the noise measure.
A. Curve Fitting Results
In this section, we present some exemplary results of fitted yield curves using the
Svensson (1994) approach. For this purpose, we plot several examples of modelimplied yield curves as lines and the market observed bond yields, marked by “+”,
“o” or “x” for each ASEAN-5 country in Figure 1. For each country, three different
months are shown: One month during the global financial crisis represented by
November 2008 “+” and two random months, September 2014 “o” and April 2017
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2021
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“x”, which represent tranquil months in terms of yield curve fitting. We expect the
observed yields during tranquil periods to be roughly “in line” across the entire
yield curve, so that the curve fitting process works well. Contrarily, in November
2008, we expect high levels of dispersion in bond yields over the entire yield curve,
leading to a higher noise and a higher level of illiquidity. Observed bond yields
with a higher maturity are approximately in line. As the higher maturity bond
yields do not seem to capture a lot of information for our illiquidity measure, we
focus on the first 15 years in the following analysis of the plots of the respective
ASEAN-5 countries. For Indonesia and the Philippines, there is a lack of observed
yields within the mid-term yield curve in November 2008.
Figure 1.
Estimated model-implied Yield and market-observed Yield Curves
The figure plots estimated model-implied yield curves, shown as solid lines, and the market-observed bond yields,
marked by “+”, “o” or “x” for countries Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand are estimated
at September 2014 and April 2017 in order to show the yield curve fitting in tranquil periods.
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Figure 1.
Estimated model-implied Yield and market-observed Yield Curves (Continued)
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These “gaps” might be a problem, since information for the missing interval
of maturities are not considered in our illiquidity measure. Moreover, the yield
curve of the Philippines “slips away” from the observed yields after the gap. Thus,
an increase in noise does not arise from dispersion in long-term maturity bond
yields, but from bad curve fitting. We assume this could be due to either the gaps
within the yield curve and/or a lack of computing capacity. Despite this problem,
the graph also shows a way higher dispersion in bond yields up to ten years
maturity for November 2008 compared to the other months. Thus, the results of
noise still follow the right intuition, however, the level might be a little overstated.
Contrarily, the yield curve fitting process for the tranquil months works well for
Indonesia and the Philippines.
For Singapore, the yield curves in November 2008 and April 2017 move freely
at the very short end, showing a big downswing, proceeding from a high level
that does not fit the rest of the yield curve. The free movement at the very short
end arises from a lack of data for yields with low maturities. Despite the fact that
we have no information from the short end of the yield curve for our illiquidity
measure, the lack of short maturity bond yields does not affect our measure, as
we do not calculate deviations when no yields are observed. More importantly,
the rest of the yield curves and the observed yields for Singapore show that the
increases in noise, during the financial crisis, were not a result of poor curve fitting
on this month. Instead, they were caused by high levels of dispersion in bond
yields across the yield curve, while the observed yields during tranquil months
were more in line. This important fact can also be discovered for Thailand. For
Malaysia the yield curve fitting works quite well, despite showing more noise in
September 2014.
B. Illiquidity (Noise) Measure
Next, we analyse the estimated illiquidity measures for the various markets. Figure
2 illustrates the monthly evolution of sovereign bond illiquidity, Noisejm, while
Table 2 presents key descriptive statistics of monthly sovereign bond illiquidity
and changes in sovereign bond illiquidity, ΔNoisejm. The plot of illiquidity levels,
shown in Figure 2, provides very heterogeneous results. The empirical result
of Singapore’s sovereign bond market noise follows our a priori expectations,
jumping up to its maximum of roughly 87 basis points during the global financial
crisis, while fluctuating around a low level of roughly 5 basis points after the crisis,
showing the lowest level of noise during tranquil periods of all the ASEAN-5 bond
markets.
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Figure 2.
Monthly Evolution of Sovereign Bond Illiquidity in ASEAN Countries
The plots contain Noisejm in basis points for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The sample
period is from January 2008 to January 2019, except for Malaysia which starts on August 2009.
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Figure 2.
Monthly Evolution of Sovereign Bond Illiquidity in ASEAN Countries (Continued)
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1.00
0.21
-0.33
0.13

27.332
7.548
46.209
10.263
-0.035
-0.040
0.025
-5.88***
-8.48***

Malaysia

1.00
0.02
-0.07

23.790
8.152
45.452
8.469
0.537
-0.544
7.962
-3.64***
-5.10***

Noisejm
Philippines
17.649
10.203
47.345
5.704
1.367
1.053
49.269
-3.56***
-5.21***

0.007
13.711
45.201
-40.116
0.060
2.263
30.288
-12.97***
-25.38***

1.00
0.33
1.00

1.00
-0.05
-0.11
0.09
0.21

Panel B: Correlation Matrix

10.768
18.207
86.559
1.979
3.130
8.641
653.060
-2.49
-2.53

Singapore
Thailand Indonesia
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics

1.00
-0.03
-0.02
0.08

0.186
9.124
30.032
-25.093
-0.087
1.995
20.617
-12.14***
-22.56***

Malaysia

1.00
0.05
0.07

0.243
6.540
21.754
-30.188
-0.906
3.908
107.070
-10.75***
-16.58***

ΔNoisejm
Philippines

1.00
-0.03

-0.014
6.565
29.266
-51.564
-2.811
30.596
5501.30
-6.69***
-9.71***

Singapore

1.00

-0.126
8.480
31.798
-29.188
0.038
2.988
52.195
-13.02***
-21.82***

Thailand

Panel A contains descriptive statistics of sovereign bond illiquidity at levels, Noisejm, and at first differences, ΔNoisejm, for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
The reported unit root tests are the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests for levels and first differences. JB denotes the Jarque-Bera normality test. Panel B
provides the correlation matrix. The sample period for Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand is from January 2008 to January 2019 for the level and from February 2008 to
January 2019 for the first differences. The sample period for Malaysia is from August 2009 to January 2019 for the level and from September 2009 to January 2019 for the first differences.
Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively.

Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics of Noise
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Contrarily, the time variation of noise levels for all other ASEAN-5 countries
are difficult to interpret. The results of the Philippines and Thailand show a higher
level of noise of around 40 basis points during the financial crisis. However, after
the financial crisis there are plenty of jumps in noise, which cannot be linked to
a market-wide liquidity event, contrary to our a priori expectations. Furthermore,
Thailand shows a lower average level of noise (17.6 basis points) compared to
the Philippines (23.8 basis points), whereas the standard deviation of Thailand is
higher.
The noise level results of Indonesia show the highest level of discontinuity,
spiking up and plummeting frequently within a range from around 5 to 68 basis
points, while showing a mean of 23.1 basis points. For Malaysia, the noise level
results also indicate high fluctuation around the highest mean of all countries (27.3
basis points). As there are no bond observations before August 2009, we cannot
compare these tranquil period results to the global financial crisis. Moreover, the
descriptive statistics of Malaysia can hardly be compared to the other countries as
they are based on a different sample period. For all countries, except for Malaysia,
the Jarque-Bera statistics imply that the empirical distribution of noise levels
deviates strongly from the normal distribution.
Besides the fact that the noise level results for Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand deviate quite far from our expectations, our empirical
results for these markets show jumps in noise during the financial crisis. These
results indicate a potential, economically plausible explanation for the unexpected
time series variation in noise. While Singapore has the highest possible credit
rating (i.e. Aaa) on sovereign bonds throughout the whole sample period, and
can, thus, be treated as a safe haven, the remaining countries have a weaker rating.
In addition, arbitrageurs also account for basic market liquidity, which can be
determined by market size and tightness (bid/ask spread). Therefore, the safe
haven rating and a higher level of basic liquidity in Singapore’s sovereign bond
market could also explain why in tranquil periods small deviations in this yield
curve are eliminated by arbitrage immediately, while there are a delayed reaction
and higher yield curve deviations in the other markets (Singapore’s average noise
level is 10.77, which is also the lowest among all ASEAN-5 countries, see Table 2).
In addition, Table 2 presents some further descriptive statistics about the
monthly changes in noise, ΔNoisejm. Since we calculate our measure in basis points,
the mean of the noise changes is very close to zero for all countries. Moreover,
for all countries, the Jarque-Bera statistic reveals that the empirical distribution
deviates strongly from the normal distribution. The kurtosis of Singapore and
the Philippines is higher than three, which indicates a leptokurtic distribution.
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore are characterized by a negative skewness,
while Singapore shows the highest absolute level of skewness (-2.811). Since the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests
indicate that the noise levels for Singapore are not stationary, we use the changes
in noise instead of levels for further empirical analysis. The reported unit root test
statistics clearly confirm the absence of a unit root in noise changes. In addition,
we find that noise changes are quite weakly correlated between the countries,
whereas the correlation matrix of the noise levels shows mild correlations between
the pairs Singapore/Malaysia and Singapore/Thailand.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol23/iss4/3
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C. Drivers of Illiquidity
In this section, we study the explanatory power of potential illiquidity drivers.
For this purpose, we estimate Eq. (3) for each ASEAN-5 sovereign bond market.
In addition, we impose AR(1) and AR(2) terms in the regression to account for
potential serial correlation. Moreover, we consider two different sample periods.
The first sample period, which is used in Table 3, spans from January 2008 to January
2019 and includes the global financial crisis as a market-wide liquidity event. Since
the Malaysian bond data is not available throughout the whole sample period,
we exclude the country from the first estimation in order to obtain comparable
results. The second sample period, which is used in Table 4, is from August 2009 to
January 2019 and includes all ASEAN countries, while not considering a marketwide liquidity event. Since not all potential illiquidity drivers have the same units,
we standardize any time series by using its sample mean and standard deviation.
In order to achieve a reliable inference on statistical significance of the results,
we estimate heteroskedasticity and serial correlation adjusted standard errors of
Newey and West (1987) throughout all the regression specifications. We use the
variance inflation factor (VIF) to examine whether the outcomes, given in Tables
3 and 4, are distorted by multicollinearity. Unreported results reveal that for all
explanatory variables, VIFj<5 holds, therefore, there is no severe multicollinearity
in our model.
Given Table 3, we find that our regression model for Singapore has the highest
explanatory power, exhibiting an adjusted R² of nearly 28%. In addition, for this
model, all estimated signs of significant variables and at the same time most of the
estimated signs of all explanatory variables are in line with the expected signs. This
is not the case for the rest of the countries, which is not surprising as illiquidity in
these countries is more noise driven.
Table 3.
Illiquidity Drivers Including the Global Financial Crisis
The table shows estimated β-coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) of Eq. (3) for the monthly changes in noise
measure for Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. For Singapore, we estimate two regressions:
Singapore (1) comprises the same variables as all other countries, while Singapore (2) replaces the common variable
ΔEPUm with the country-specific variable ΔEPUmSing. The standard errors of the t-statistics are calculated by the
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance estimator of Newey and West (1987). The regression
coefficients are standardized. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. The
sample period is from January 2008 to January 2019.

Variable
ΔCBSm
ΔEPUm
ΔBondVm
ΔSlopem
ΔVIXm

Indonesia
-0.0584
(-0.08)
-0.7417
(-0.87)
1.0080
(0.93)
0.4325
(0.26)
0.2081
(0.24)

Philippines Singapore (1) Singapore (2)
Panel A: Common Variables
1.0886**
(2.29)
-1.3487***
(-3.07)
1.0003*
(1.80)
-0.4010
(-0.95)
-1.1106**
(-2.50)

3.1662***
(6.18)
0.7948**
(2.50)
0.6558
(1.21)
0.4866
(1.35)
-0.4409
(-0.82)
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3.2007***
(6.29)
0.6308
(1.12)
0.5101
(1.43)
-0.4335
(-0.83)

Thailand
0.0848
(0.17)
0.6051
(1.10)
0.1626
(0.36)
1.7449**
(2.11)
0.2977
(0.39)
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Table 3.
Illiquidity Drivers Including the Global Financial Crisis (Continued)
Variable
ΔEPUmSing
REjm
RGjm
ΔGDPjm
ΔInflationjm
∆Noisejm-1
∆Noisejm-2
R²
Adjusted R²
Observations

Indonesia
Philippines Singapore (1) Singapore (2)
Panel B: Country-specific Variables
0.5543
(0.56)
0.6461
(0.68)
-0.4506
(-0.48)
1.0219
(0.97)
-8.2982***
(-9.58)
-3.9567***
(-3.47)
0.2954
0.2297
130

-12.1613
(-1.22)
-15.1860*
(-1.69)
-3.6694
(-0.39)
29.1179
(0.33)
-2.4804***
(-4.21)
-0.9891*
(-1.88)
0.3167
0.2530
130

0.0366
(0.05)
-0.1744
(-0.46)
-1.4074***
(-3.05)
-0.3869
(-1.06)
0.3219
(1.01)
0.4971
(0.88)
0.3391
0.2775
130

0.9138***
(3.03)
0.0781
(0.10)
-0.1772
(-0.46)
-1.4462***
(-3.15)
-0.3847
(-1.09)
0.3291
(1.00)
0.4798
(0.84)
0.3430
0.2818
130

Thailand
-0.5566
(-0.87)
0.1763
(0.23)
-0.3829
(-0.94)
-0.5904
(-1.28)
-4.8373***
(-5.21)
-2.6267***
(-3.29)
0.3224
0.2592
130

We start with the results of the common variables. The changes in corporate
bond spreads are highly significant for Singapore and significant (at the 5 percent
level) for the Philippines with the expected positive sign. This result seems highly
sensible, since one of the fundamental causes of the global financial crisis was a
credit boom (Acharya and Richardson, 2009). Global economic policy uncertainty
is significant for the Philippines and Singapore, showing the expected positive
sign for Singapore and an unexpected negative sign for the Philippines. The
result for Singapore complies with the theory that uncertainty reduces liquidity
provision in financial markets. Concerning the relation between changes in
implied bond volatility and changes in noise, we find a significant and expectedly
positive relation for the Philippines, which is significant at the 10 percent level.
For changes in the term structure slope, we find a significant positive result for
Thailand. Finally, changes in VIX are significantly negatively related to changes in
noise for the Philippines, opposing our expectations.
We continue by examining the estimation results of the country-specific
variables. The Singapore-specific changes in economic policy uncertainty, which
are only used in model “Singapore (2)”, show a higher expectedly positive
significance than changes in global economic policy uncertainty. This indicates
that the noise measure also captures some information about the country-specific
liquidity conditions. Local equity returns are not significant in any of the ASEAN-5
sovereign bond markets, while the GDP growth rate is highly significant, showing
an expectedly negative sign in Singapore. Thus, the business cycle might be more
related to our illiquidity measure than the more forward-looking local business
climate. Concerning the relation between the local gold return and changes
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol23/iss4/3
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in noise, we only find a single negative relation for the Philippines, which is
significant at the 10 percent level. The negative coefficient is not in line with the
theoretical expectation. In times of a market-wide liquidity stress event, investors
might be forced to sell some or all of their holdings, which can lead to a decline
in returns. The inflation rate, as our second macroeconomic variable, is not
significant in any of the countries. Given its forward-looking character, following
the assumptions of the Phillips Curve, the results are consistent with the findings
for the local business climate (expressed by local equity returns). Thus, the
aggregate business cycle might be a more important macroeconomic explanatory
variable than the inflation rate. For Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, we
report negative autocorrelation, which is highly significant. This underlines our
considerations in the previous section econometrically that the results in noise
for these countries are not persistent as expected, but mean reverse. Overall, we
find consistent econometric results for Singapore. The main driver of illiquidity in
Singapore’s sovereign bond market is the corporate bond spread, as a proxy for
the aggregate credit cycle. Moreover, an increase in economic policy uncertainty
and declines in the aggregate business cycle significantly drive sovereign bond
illiquidity in Singapore. For Indonesia, the only explanatory variables that drive
illiquidity are negative autocorrelation of first and second order, reflecting the
mean reverse results of noise. The Philippines and Thailand are also driven by
negative autocorrelation. However, in these sovereign bond markets, we can also
identify some significant explainable variables, where the signs of the coefficients
follow our theoretical expectations.
Table 4 includes the information on the Malaysian sovereign bond market,
while excluding the global financial crisis event. By not considering any marketwide liquidity event within this sample period, our results show that changes
in noise are mainly driven by negative autocorrelation in Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand, implying a mean reversion in noise changes. In the
Philippines, first order autocorrelation is negative at the 5 percent level. Indonesia
and Malaysia do not show any other illiquidity driver, while, for the Philippines,
changes in global economic policy uncertainty are significant at the 5 percent level
and negatively related to changes in noise, opposing our theoretical expectations.
The contradicting sign of global economic policy uncertainty for the Philippines
may be explained by a paradigm shift in foreign direct investments due to a
shrinking share of U.S. direct investment in the total share of the Philippines
foreign direct investments in the recent years as well as increased risk aversion
in the region. The changes in corporate bond spread for Singapore turn from a
highly significant positive result in Table 3 to a significant negative result in Table
4. During the global financial crisis, illiquidity in Singapore’s sovereign bond
market increased sharply and declined quickly afterwards to its normal level
(see Figure 2). This might explain the sign change as both corporate bond yield
spreads as well as the illiquidity of Singapore sovereign bond market are at a high
level during the global financial crisis. However, in tranquil periods, Singapore’s
sovereign bond market is very liquid and therefore its illiquidity is negatively
related to the corporate bond market. Lastly, changes in term structure slope are
highly significant in Thailand and significant at the 5 percent level in Singapore,
showing opposite signs. Overall, we find very few significant variables and most
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2021
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of them are contrary to the theoretical expectations. The Singapore sovereign
bond market, especially, shows completely opposing results compared to the
first sample period, which included the global financial crisis. However, these are
not bad results at all, as they indicate that our explanatory variables can explain
illiquidity jumps during a market-wide illiquidity event but not the fluctuation of
noise on a very low level during tranquil periods.
Table 4.
Illiquidity Drivers Excluding a Market-Wide Liquidity Event
The table shows estimated β-coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) of Eq. (3) for the monthly changes in the
noise measure for Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. For Singapore, we estimate two regressions:
Singapore (1) comprises the same variables as all other countries, while Singapore (2) replaces the common variable
ΔEPUm with the country-specific variable ΔEPUmSing. The standard errors of the t-statistics are calculated by the
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance estimator of Newey and West (1987). The regression
coefficients are standardized. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. The
sample period is from August 2009 to January 2019.

Variable
ΔCBSm
ΔEPUm
ΔBondVm
ΔSlopem
ΔVIXm

Singapore
(1)
Panel A: Common Variables

Indonesia Malaysia
-0.1238
(-0.09)
0.0611
(0.07)
0.1078
(0.09)
1.2456
(0.68)
0.8346
(0.84)

Philippines

-0.7757
(-0.91)
-0.3622
(-0.46)
-0.2674
(-0.46)
-1.0929
(-1.66)
0.6735
(0.88)

0.4774
(0.79)
-1.1566**
(-2.12)
0.5111
(0.68)
-0.1209
(-0.28)
-0.9039*
(-1.91)

-0.396**
(-2.16)
0.1973
(1.17)
0.0487
(0.23)
-0.4026**
(-2.45)
0.2263
(1.11)

Singapore
(2)

Thailand

-0.386**
(-2.12)
0.0390
(0.18)
-0.3871**
(-2.43)
0.2224
(1.09)

0.6619
(1.30)
0.9997
(1.57)
-0.1585
(-0.24)
2.1828***
(2.78)
0.5277
(0.81)

0.2547
(1.52)
-0.2446
(-1.41)
-0.0826
(-0.54)
0.2366
(1.21)
-0.0309
(-0.16)
-1.330***
(-8.83)
-1.0791***
(-6.16)
0.4443
0.3826
111

-0.4125
(-0.63)
0.0371
(0.05)
-0.5235
(-0.94)
-0.2532
(-0.44)
-6.081***
(-9.37)
-3.409***
(-4.59)
0.4366
0.3740
111

Panel B: Country-specific Variables
ΔEPUmSing
REjm
RGjm
ΔGDPjm
ΔInflationjm
∆Noisejm-1
∆Noisejm-2
R²
Adjusted R²
Observations

0.8599
(0.73)
1.0943
(1.08)
-0.2717
(-0.29)
1.3826
(1.48)
-8.001***
(-8.00)
-3.995***
(-3.50)
0.3129
0.2366
111

-0.1266
(-0.13)
0.5576
(0.67)
-0.1643
(-0.28)
-0.6164
(-1.01)
-5.393***
(-4.20)
-2.403***
(-5.10)
0.3377
0.2641
111
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-16.7762
(-1.38)
-10.9196
(-1.1)
-15.6224
(-1.53)
-7.5476
(-0.05)
-1.6587**
(-2.52)
-0.1556
(-0.31)
0.2430
0.1589
111

-0.2606
(-1.48)
-0.0807
(-0.51)
0.2530
(1.26)
-0.0271
(-0.14)
-1.341***
(-8.92)
-1.090***
(-6.25)
0.4401
0.3778
111
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS
The previous literature using price deviations in the yield curve as a measure of
illiquidity mostly focuses on illiquidity conditions in the largest and highest rated
sovereign bond markets of developed countries. We contribute to the existing
literature by analyzing the ASEAN-5 sovereign markets, which are much smaller
than the U.S. market (see Footnote 1). This aspect is very important for investors as
bond liquidity is one of the major drivers of sovereign bond yields (Kinateder and
Wagner, 2017). Our results show that illiquidity conditions between the ASEAN-5
sovereign bond markets are heterogeneous in many ways.
Firstly, illiquidity conditions in Singapore are closely related to those of
the largest sovereign bond markets, such as the U.S. (Hu et al., 2013) and Japan
(Hattori, 2019), implying a low liquidity risk exposure for investors during tranquil
periods and significant risk premiums in a market-wide liquidity event (i.e. the
global financial crisis). In addition, illiquidity in Singapore is driven by economic
variables that were also found by previous studies (see e.g., Brunnermeier and
Pedersen, 2009; Gilchrist et al., 2009; Nagel, 2012; Adrian et al., 2017). Secondly,
noise in the remaining ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets is significantly
higher during tranquil periods compared to Singapore and arbitrage eliminates
larger deviations not immediately but in a delayed manner, indicating that the
risk exposure to liquidity is on average higher for investors and can hardly be
anticipated by changes in economic drivers.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper examines illiquidity conditions during the period January 2008
to January 2019 in five ASEAN sovereign bond markets, namely Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, by exploiting price deviations
in the yield curve, based on the noise measure introduced by Hu et al. (2013).
The application of an innovative bond-specific noise measure to the ASEAN-5
sovereign bond markets distinguishes our work from earlier studies. Furthermore,
we apply a multiple regression using a comprehensive set of explanatory
variables in order to identify the drivers of illiquidity in the respective markets.
Our results for Singapore show that the noise measure in this specific market is
related to three economic drivers. The main driver is the corporate bond spread,
as a proxy for the aggregate credit cycle, while at the same time an increase in
economic policy uncertainty and declines in the aggregate business cycle, proxied
by GDP growth rate, significantly drive sovereign bond illiquidity in Singapore.
By studying two different sample periods, we find that our explanatory variables
can explain illiquidity jumps in Singapore during a market-wide illiquidity event
but not the fluctuation of noise on a very low level during tranquil periods. Our
empirical results for Singapore also indicate that the noise measure does not only
contain market-wide information, but also unique country-specific information,
which is in line with the deliberations of Durham (2015). However, illiquidity
of the remainder ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets is mostly characterized by
negative autocorrelation and not by economic drivers. The illiquidity in Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand might react in a delayed manner as
markets have lower credit ratings and basic liquidity, which may reduce the
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2021
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number of international arbitrageurs. This possible explanation could be a topic
for future research that may address this issue in more detail.
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